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Randomness? What randomness?
Klaas Landsman
a
Dedicated to Gerard ’t Hooft, on the 20th anniversary of his Nobel Prizeb
Abstract
This is a review of the issue of randomness in quantum mechanics, with special empha-
sis on its ambiguity; for example, randomness has different antipodal relationships to
determinism, computability, and compressibility. Following a (Wittgensteinian) philo-
sophical discussion of randomness in general, I argue that deterministic interpretations
of quantum mechanics (like Bohmian mechanics or ’t Hooft’s Cellular Automaton in-
terpretation) are strictly speaking incompatible with the Born rule. I also stress the
role of outliers, i.e. measurement outcomes that are not 1-random. Although these
occur with low (or even zero) probability, their very existence implies that the no-
signaling principle used in proofs of randomness of outcomes of quantum-mechanical
measurements (and of the safety of quantum cryptography) should be reinterpreted
statistically, like the second law of thermodynamics. In appendices I discuss the Born
rule and its status in both single and repeated experiments, and review the notion of
1-randomness introduced by Kolmogorov, Chaitin, Martin-Lo¨f, Schnorr, and others.
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1 Introduction
‘Quantum mechanics commands much respect. But an inner voice tells me
that it is not Mr. Right. The theory delivers a lot, but it hardly brings us
closer to the mystery of the Old Man. Anyway, I’m sure he does not play dice.
(Einstein to Born, 1926).1
‘In our scientific expectations we have grown antipodes. You believe in God
playing dice and I in perfect laws in the world of things existing as real objects,
which I try to grasp in a wildly speculative way.’ (Einstein to Born, 1944).2
Einstein’s idea of ‘perfect laws’ that should in particular be deterministic is also central to ’t
Hooft’s view of physics, as exemplified by his intriguing Cellular Automaton Interpretation
of Quantum Mechanics (’t Hooft, 2016). The aim of this paper is to provide arguments
against this view,3 but even if these turn out to be unsuccessful I hope to contribute to the
debate about the issue of determinism versus randomness by providing a broad view of the
latter.4 My point of view is that, as argued in §2, randomness is a family resemblance in
the sense of Wittgenstein (Sluga, 2006), but a special one that is always defined through
its anti-pole, which may change according to the specific use of the term.
The anti-pole defining which particular notion of randomness is meant may vary even
within quantum mechanics, and here two main candidates arise (§3): one is determinism,
as emphatically meant by Born (1926) and most others who claim that randomness is
somehow ‘fundamental’ in quantum theory, but the other is compressibility or any of the
other equivalent notions defining what is called 1-randomness in mathematics as its anti-
pole (see Appendix B for an explanation of this). The interplay between these different
notions of randomness is the topic of §5, in which I argue that one cannot eat one’s cake
and have it, in the sense of having a deterministic hidden variable theory underneath
quantum mechanics that is strictly compatible with the Born rule. I also argue, more
wildly, that Einstein’s prohibition of superluminal signaling should be demoted from an
absolute to a statistical law, much as the second law of thermodynamics. This analysis
relies on an in-depth (re)view of the Born rule, presented in Appendix A.
1The German original is: ‘Die Quantenmechanik ist sehr achtung-gebietend. Aber eine innere Stimme
sagt mir, daß das doch nicht der wahre Jakob ist. Die Theorie liefert viel, aber dem Geheimnis des Alten
bring sie uns kaum na¨her. Jedenfalls bin ich u¨berzeugt, daß der nicht wu¨rfelt.’ (Translation by the author.)
The source is Einstein’s letter to Max Born from December 4, 1926, see Einstein & Born (2005), p. 154.
Note the italics in der, or he in English: Einstein surely means that it is not God but the physicists who
play dice. Since some authors claim the opposite, it may be worth emphasizing that this complaint against
the indeterminism of quantum mechanics as expressed in Born (1926), to which Einstein replies here (see
also §3 below for the specific passage that must have upset Einstein), forms the sole contents of this letter;
Einstein’s objections to the non-locality of the theory only emerged in the 1930s. Even Pais (1982, p. 440),
who should have known better, confuses the issue by misattributing the ‘God does not play dice’ quotation
to a letter by Einstein to Lanczos from as late as March 21, 1942, in which at one stroke he complains
that ‘It seems hard to look into God’s cards. But I cannot for a moment believe that He plays dice and
makes use of “telepathic” means (as the current quantum theory alleges He does).’
2Letter dated November 7, 1944. Strangely, this letter is not contained in the Einstein–Born Briefwech-
sel 1916–1955 cited in the previous footnote; the source is Born (1949, p. 176) and the translation is his.
3 What I will not argue for here is the real reason I do not believe in perfect laws, namely the idea
of Emergence, according to which there are no fundamental laws, let alone perfect ones: every (alleged)
law originates in some lower substratum, which itself is subject to laws originating in yet another realm.
As I like to say: ‘Nothing in science makes sense except in the light of emergence’ (free after Theodosius
Dobzhansky, who famously wrote that ‘nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution.’
4See Bricmont et al (2001), Bub & Bub (2018), Cassirer (1936), Frigg (2016), Loewer (2001), Nath Bera
et al (2017), Svozil (1993, 2018), and Vaidman (2014) for other perspectives on randomness in physics.
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2 Randomness as a family resemblance
‘The idea that in order to get clear about the meaning of a general term one had
to find the common element in all its applications has shackled philosophical
investigation; for it has not only led to no result, but also made the philosopher
dismiss as irrelevant the concrete cases, which alone could have helped him to
understand the usage of the general term.’ (Wittgenstein, Blue Book, §§19–20).
‘I’m saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common in virtue of
which we use the same word for all – but there are many kinds of affinity
between them. (. . . ) we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping
and criss-crossing: similarities in the large and in the small. I can think of no
better expression to characterize these similarities than “family resemblances”;
for the various resemblances between members of a family – build, features,
colour of eyes, gait, temperament, and so on and so forth – overlap and criss-
cross in the same way.’ (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §§65–67).
Though he did not mention it himself, randomness seems a prime example of a phenomenon
Wittgenstein would call a ‘family resemblance’.5 Independently, as noted by historians
Lu¨thy & Palmerino (2016) on the basis of examples from antiquity and medieval thought,6
the various different meanings of randomness (or chance) can all be identified by their anti-
pole. Combining these ideas, I submit that randomness is not just any old Wittgensteinian
family resemblance, but a special one that is always defined negatively.
• To begin with, in Aristotle’s famous example of a man who goes to the market and
walks into his debtor, the randomness of the encounter derives from the fact that
the man did not go the the market in order to meet his debtor (but instead went
there to buy food). Similarly for the man who digs a hole in his garden to plant
a tree and finds a treasure. Even the birth of female babies (and certain other
‘chance substances’ for which he literally uses the Greek word for ‘monsters’) was
identified by The Philosopher as a failure of purpose in Nature. Thus what actually
happened in all these examples was accidental because (as we would say it) it was
not intended, or, in Aristotelian parlance, because there was no final cause. By the
same token, Aristotle found the atomistic cosmos of Democritus “random” because
it was purposeless, ridiculing him for making the cosmic order a product of chance.
• In contrast, half a century later Epicurus found the atomic world not random at all
and introduced randomness through the ‘swerve’, immortalized by Lucretius:
‘When the atoms are traveling straight down through empty space by their
own weight, at quite indeterminate times and places they swerve ever so
little from their course, just so much that you can call it a change of
direction. If it were not for this swerve, everything would fall downwards
like raindrops through the abyss of space. No collision would take place
and no impact of atom on atom would be created. Thus nature would
never have created anything.’ (De Rerum Natura, Book II).7
5This may be worth emphasizing, since even first-rate philosophers like Eagle (2005) still try to nail it
down, ironically citing other philosophers who also did precisely that, but allegedly in the ‘wrong’ way!
6See Vogt (2011) for a comprehensive survey of the historical usage of randomness and chance etc.,
including references to original sources. See also Lu¨thy & Palmerino (2016) for a brief summary.
7See Lucretius (1951), p. 66. See als Greenblatt (2011) for the thrilling rediscovery of De Rerum Natura.
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This was, so to speak, the first complaint against determinism (the goal of Epicu-
rus/Lucretius was to make room for free will in a world otherwise seen as effectively
dead because of the everlasting sequence of cause and effect), and indeed, in the
context of our analysis, the key point is that the swerve is random because it is
‘indeterminate’, or because the atoms depart from their natural straight course.
• Neither of these classical meanings is at all identical with the dominant usage from
medieval times to the early 20th century, which was exemplified by Spinoza, who
claimed that not only miracles, but also circumstances that have concurred by chance
are reducible to ignorance of the true causes of phenomena, for which ultimately the
will of God (‘the sanctuary of ignorance’) is invoked as a placeholder.8 Thus Spinozist
randomness lies in the absence of full knowledge of the entire causal chain of events.
• In the Leibniz–Clarke correspondence,9 the latter, speaking for Newton, meant in-
voluntariness by randomness, which constraint he and Newton, against Leibniz,
denied at least God could have. Leibniz, on the other hand, in some sense ahead
of his time (yet in another following Epicurus/Lucretius), used the word ‘random’
to designate the absence of a determining cause–a possibility which he (unlike Epi-
curus/Lucretius) denied on the basis of his principle of sufficient reason.10 This is
clear from an interesting passage which is not widely known and predates Laplace:
‘One sees then that everything proceeds mathematically - that is, infallibly
- in the whole wide world, so that if someone could have sufficient insight
into the inner parts of things, and in addition has remembrance and in-
telligence enough to consider all the circumstances and to take them into
account, he would be a prophet and would see the future in the present as
in a mirror.’11
• Arbuthnot, a younger contemporary and follower of Newton, may have been the
first author to explicitly address the role of randomness in the deterministic setting
of Newtonian physics. In the Preface to his translation of Huygens’s path-breaking
book De Ratiociniis in Ludo Aleae on probability theory,12 he wrote:
‘It is impossible for a Die, with such determin’d force and direction, not
to fall on such determin’d side, only I don’t know the force and direction
which makes it fall on such determin’d side, and therefore I call it Chance,
which is nothing but the want of Art.’
And similarly, but highlighting the alleged negativity of the concept even more:
8See Ethics, Part I, Appendix.
9See also Lu¨thy & Palmerino (2016), §2.7 for part of the following analysis. The Leibniz–Clarke corre-
spondence is available in many editions, such as Vailati (1997), and the online edition Bennett (2017).
10Hacking (1990, Ch. 2) calls this the doctrine of necessity and shows it pervaded early modern thought.
11The German original is quoted and referenced by Cassirer (1936): ‘Hieraus sieht man nun, das alles
mathematisch, d.i. ohnfehlbar zugehe in der ganzen weiten Welt, so gar, dass wenn einer eine genugsame
Insicht in die inneren Teile der Dinge haben ko¨nnte, und dabei Geda¨chtnis und Verstand genug ha¨tte,
um alle Umsta¨nde vor zu nehmen und in Rechnung zu bringen, wu¨rde er ein Prophet sein, und in dem
Gegenwa¨rtigen das Zuku¨nftige sehen, gleichsam als in einem Spiegel.’ English translation by the author.
12The Latin original De Ratiociniis in Ludo Aleae is from 1657 and Arbuthnot’s English translation On
the Laws of Chance appeared in 1692. The quotation is taken from Diaconis & Skyrms (2018), p. 9.
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‘Chance, in atheistical writings or discourse, is a sound utterly insignifi-
cant: It imports no determination to any mode of Existence; nor in deed to
Existence itself, more than to non existence; it can neither be defined nor
understood; nor can any Proposition concerning it be either affirmed or
denied, excepting this one, “That it is a mere word.”’ (De Moivre, 1718).13
So this is entirely in the medieval spirit, where ignorance–this time relative to New-
ton’s physics as the ticket to full knowledge–is seen as the origin of randomness.
• A century later, and like Arbuthnot and De Moivre in a book on probability theory
(Essai philosophique sur les probabilite´s, from 1814), Laplace portrayed his demon
to make the point that randomness arises in the absence of such an intellect:14
‘An intelligence which could comprehend all the forces that set nature
in motion, and all positions of all items of which nature is composed–
an intelligence sufficiently vast to submit these data to analysis–it would
embrace in the same formula the movements of the greatest bodies in the
universe and those of the lightest atom; for it, nothing would be uncertain
and the future, as well as the past, would be present to its eyes.’
Note that Leibniz’ prophet appeals to the logical structure of the universe that
makes it deterministic, whereas Laplace’s intelligence knows (Newtonian) physics.15
In any case, it is important to note that Laplacian randomness is defined within a
deterministic world,16 so that its anti-pole is not indeterminism but full knowledge
(and computing power, etc.). Indeed, less well known than the above quotation is
the following one, from the very same source:
‘All events, even those which on account of their insignificance do not seem
to follow the great laws of nature, are a result of it just as necessarily as
the revolutions of the sun.’17
• The ignorance interpretation of randomness and chance still lurks behind the prob-
abilities introduced in the 19th century in statistical mechanics, which in my view
were therefore wholeheartedly construed in the medieval and early modern sprit.18
13Quoted by Hacking (1990, p. 13) from De Moivre’s Doctrine of Chance, originally written in English.
14The translation is from Laplace (1902), p. 4. See van Strien (2014) for history and analysis.
15However, van Strien (2014) argues that Laplace also falls back on Leibniz (and gets the physics wrong
by not mentioning the momenta that the intelligence should know, too, besides the forces and positions).
16Famously: ‘The world W is Laplacian deterministic just in case for any physically possible world W ′,
if W and W ′ agree at any time, then they agree at all time.’ (Earman, 1986, p. 13).
17Quoted by Hacking (1990), p. 11.
18 It is often maintained that these probabilities are objective, which might cast doubt over the idea
that they originate in ignorance. I personally find the distinction between “objective” and “subjective”
chances quite unhelpful in the context of fundamental physics, a left-over from (by now) irrelevant and
outdated attempts to define probabilities “objectively” as relative frequencies (see also Appendix B) as
opposed to interpreting them “subjectively” as credences a` la Ramsey. For example, Loewer (2001, 2004)
claims that the probabilities in statistical mechanics are objective and are as objective as those in quantum
mechanics. But both are predicated on a subjective choice of observables, based on ignoring microscopic and
quantum-mechanical degrees of freedom, respectively. Given that choice, the probabilities are subsequently
objective, but the choice itself is surely subjective (see also Heisenberg quoted in §3 below). Instead of a
pointless table-tennis game between “objective” and “subjective”, a better term would be “perspectival”.
For example, I agree with Rovelli (2017) that time’s arrow is perspectival (and hence is not “objective”).
See also Jaynes (1985), pp. 118–120, for similar comments on terminology in philosophy of probability.
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• Hacking (1990) explains how the doctrine of necessity began to erode in the 19th
century, largely through the use of statistics in population studies and biology.19 In
philosophy, the century culminated in the famous words of Peirce (1892, p. 337):
‘I believe I have thus subjected to fair examination all the important rea-
sons for adhering to the theory of universal necessity, and shown their
nullity. (. . . ) If my argument remains unrefuted, it will be time, I think,
to doubt the absolute truth of the principle of universal law.’
This partly paved the way for the claim of irreducible randomness in quantum me-
chanics, although the influence of population studies and biology on intrinsic devel-
opments in physics should perhaps not be overestimated. However, the insight that
probability and statistics gave rise to their own laws (as opposed to the fear that
randomness is pretty much the same as lawlessness), which partly dated back to the
previous two centuries (Hacking, 2006), surely made quantum theory possible.
• The randomness of variations in heritable traits that were introduced almost simulta-
neously with the rise of statistical physics in Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural
selection meant something completely different from Laplace etc., best expressed by
the geneticist Theodosius Dobzhansky a century later (Merlin, 2010):
‘Mutations are random changes because they occur independently of whether
they are beneficial or harmful.’
Indeed, both historically and actually, the anti-pole to Darwin’s randomness of vari-
ations is Lamarck’s goal-orientedness thereof,20 intended to strengthen the species
(like the proverbial sons of the blacksmith who according to Lamarck inherit his
strong muscles). In particular, it does not matter if the variations are of known or
unknown origin, or fall under a deterministic or an indeterministic kind of physics.
• Continuing our detour into biology, the well-known Hardy–Weinberg equilibrium law
in population genetics, which gives the relative frequencies of alleles and genotypes
in a given (infinite) population, is based on the assumption of random mating. This
means that mating takes place between pairs of individuals who have not selected
each other on the basis of their genetic traits (i.e. there is no sexual selection).
• Eagle (2005, p. 775–776) proposes that ‘randomness is maximal unpredictability’
(which agrees with criterion 3 below for binary strings), and argues that this is
equivalent to a random event being ‘probabilistically independent of the current
and past states of the system, given the probabilities supported by the theory.’
• Most people, especially those without scientific training,21 asked to mention a ran-
dom event they have encountered, typically mention what is called a coincidence.
This notion goes back at least to Aristotle, but a modern definition is the following:
19Though also inspired by the eventual rise of quantum mechanics, Kern (2004) gives a completely differ-
ent history of causality and uncertainty in the 19th and 20th centuries, tracking the changing explanatory
roles of these factors in the the study of murder as documented by more than a hundred novels.
20 As such, Spinoza’s philosophical analysis, modern physics, and (evolutionary) biology all contributed
to the downfall of the Aristotelian (and subsequently Christian) final causes my analysis started from.
21Though Stephen Hawking was not adverse to the fact that he was born on January 8th, 1942, exactly
300 years after the death of Galileo Galilei, and, had he been able to note it, would undoubtedly have
rejoiced in the equally remarkable fact that he died in 2018 on the birthday of Albert Einstein (March 14).
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‘A coincidence is a surprising concurrence of events, perceived as mean-
ingfully related, with no apparent causal connection.’
(Diaconis & Mosteller, 1989, p. 853).22
The subjective nature of this definition (as in ‘surprising’, ‘perceived’, ‘meaningful’,
and ‘apparent’) may repel the scientist, but ironically, the aim of this definition is to
debunk coincidences. Because of the contrast between coincidences in daily life we
are now talking about and coincidences in the physical setting of bipartite correlation
experiments a` la ERR–Bohm–Bell, it is interesting to briefly recall how most if not
all everyday coincidences can be rejected on the basis of the above definition:23
1. The concurrence of events was not at all as surprising as initially thought. This
argument is either based on the inability of most people to estimate probabilities
correctly (as in the well-known birthday problem), or, if the events were really
unlikely, on what Diaconis and Mosteller call the law of truly large numbers:24
‘Rare events occur with high frequency in the presence of large numbers
of events’.
2. Against first appearances there was a causal connection, either through a com-
mon cause or through direct causation. On a par with the first explanation, in
daily life this is the second way to debunk coincidences, but in physics it may fail
even when the first explanation is unlikely; indeed, the point of Bell’s Theorem
is of course that both kinds of causation are excluded in the ERR–Bohm–Bell
setting! This case will be taken up in §3 and elsewhere in this paper.
• Finally, serving our aim to compare physical and mathematical notions of random-
ness, I preview the three equivalent definitions of 1-randomness (see Appendix B
and references for details) and confirm that also they fit into our general picture.
What is being defined here is randomness of binary strings, and our discussion here
is so superficial that I will not even distinguish between finite and infinite ones.
1. A string x is 1-random if its shortest description is x itself, i.e., there exists no
lossless compression of x (in the sense of a computer program that outputs x
and whose length is shorter than the length of x): thus x is incompressible.
2. A string x is 1-random if it fails all tests for patterns (within a suitable class).
3. A string x is 1-random if there exists no successful (computable) gambling
strategy on the digits of x; roughly speaking, these digits are unpredictable.
Moving towards the main goal of the paper, I now continue our list of examples (i.e. of the
principle that randomness is a family resemblance whose different meanings are always
defined negatively through their anti-poles) in the context of quantum mechanics, which
is rich enough by itself to provide its own family of different meanings of randomness (all
duly defined negatively), although these may eventually be traceable to the above cases.25
22Perhaps confusingly, Ramsey (1926) attributes any coincidence to chance and hence would probably
even take the Diaconis–Mosteller definition to define a non-coincidence.
23For details see Landsman (2018), so far available in Dutch only. In practice it usually does not help
to argue that the events in question were not ‘meaningfully related’, since at that point semi-intellectual
opponents will invoke “synchronicities” (Jung, 1952) and the like, and leave the domain of science (as Jung
himself squarely admitted). Even if one goes along with that, discussions tend to become circular.
24In a slightly different phrasing this “law” is also called The Improbability Principle (Hand, 2015).
25 It will be clear from the way I discuss quantum mechanics that this paper will just be concerned
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3 Randomness in quantum mechanics
Already the very first (scholarly) exposition of the issue of randomness in quantum me-
chanics by Born made many of the major points that are still relevant today:
‘Thus Schro¨dinger’s quantum mechanics gives a very definite answer to the
question of the outcome of a collision; however, this does not involve any causal
relationship. One obtains no answer to the question “what is the state after
the collision,” but only to the question “how probable is a specific outcome of
the collision” (in which the quantum-mechanical law of [conservation of] energy
must of course be satisfied). This raises the entire problem of determinism.
From the standpoint of our quantum mechanics, there is no quantity that could
causally establish the outcome of a collision in each individual case; however,
so far we are not aware of any experimental clue to the effect that there are
internal properties of atoms that enforce some particular outcome. Should
we hope to discover such properties that determine individual outcomes later
(perhaps phases of the internal atomic motions)? Or should we believe that
the agreement between theory and experiment concerning our inability to give
conditions for a causal course of events is some pre-established harmony that
is based on the non-existence of such conditions? I myself tend to relinquish
determinism in the atomic world. But this is [also] a philosophical question,
for which physical arguments alone are not decisive.’ (Born, 1926, p. 866).26
Given the fact that Born was the first to discuss such things in the open literature, it
is remarkable how perceptive his words are: he marks the opposition of randomness to
determinism, recognizes the possibility of hidden variables (with negative advice though),
and understands that the issue is not just a technical one. Bravo! Having said this, in line
with the previous section our aim is, of course, to confront the anti-pole of determinism
with other possible anti-poles to randomness as it is featured by quantum mechanics.
The introduction of fundamental probabilities in quantum theory is delicate in many
ways, among which is that fact that the Schro¨dinger equation is even more deterministic
than Newton’s laws.27 Hence what is meant is randomness of measurements outcomes;
since it is not our aim (here) to solve the measurement problem–for which see Landsman
(2017), Chapter 11–I simply assume that i) measurement is a well-defined laboratory prac-
tice, and ii) measurements have outcomes. In all that follows, I also accept the statistical
predictions of quantum mechanics for these outcomes (which are based on the Born rule
reviewed in Appendix A). Even so, the claim of irreducibility of randomness, which is
typical for all versions of the Copenhagen Interpretation (and for any mainstream view
held by physicists) is almost incomprehensible, since one of the pillars of this interpreta-
tion is Bohr’s doctrine of classical concepts, according to which the apparatus is described
classically; randomness of measurement outcomes is then seen as a consequence of the
very definition of a measurement. But this suggests that randomness should be reducible
to ignorance about the quantum-mechanical degrees of freedom of the apparatus:
with process randomness, as opposed to product randomness (Eagle, 2005). There is certainly a distinction
between the two, but the former would take us into the quagmire of the measurement problem.
26Translation by the author. The reference is to the German original.
27In the sense that the solution is not only uniquely determined by the initial state, but, by Stone’s
Theorem, even exist for all t ∈ R (in other words, incomplete motion is impossible), cf. Earman (2009).
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‘these uncertainties (. . . ) are simply a consequence of the fact that we describe
the experiment in terms of classical physics.’ (Heisenberg, 1958, p. 53)
Ironically, Bell’s Theorem(s), which arose in opposition to the the Copenhagen Inter-
pretation (Cushing, 1994), did not only prove Einstein (as the leading opponent of this
interpretation) wrong on the issue that arguably mattered most to him (namely locality
in the sense defined later in a precise way by Bell), but also proved Bohr and Heisenberg
right on the irreducibility of randomness, at least if we grant them randomness per se.
Indeed, suppose we equate reducibility of randomness with the existence of a “Laplacian”
deterministic hidden variable theory (i.e. use the anti-pole of determinism), and assume,
as the Copenhagenists would be pleased to, the conjunction of the following properties:
1. The Born rule and the ensuing statistical predictions of quantum mechanics;
2. Hidden signal-locality (i.e. the impossibility of active superluminal communication
if one knows the state λ of the underlying deterministic theory);28
3. Free will (or free choice), that is, the independence of the choice of measurement
settings from the state of the system one measures using these settings, in a broad
sense of ‘state’ that includes the prepared state as well as the ‘hidden’ state λ.29
Then both Bell’s (1964) Theorem and the Free Will Theorem imply that such a deter-
ministic hidden variable theory cannot exist, and hence that the Laplacian interpretation
of randomness does not apply to quantum mechanics (granting assumptions 1–3). This
warrants the Copenhagen claim of irreducible or non-Laplacian or Leibnizian randomness.
Viable deterministic hidden variable theories compatible with the Born rule therefore
have to choose between giving up either hidden signal-locality or free will. Given this
choice, we may therefore distinguish between theories that:
• give up hidden signal-locality, like Bohmian mechanics;
• give up free will, like the cellular automata interpretation of ’t Hooft (2016).
In both cases the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics are recovered by averaging
the hidden variable or state with respect to a probability measure µψ on the space Λ of
hidden variables, given some (pure) quantum state ψ (which is assumed to be known).
The difference is that in the first case the hidden state λ determines the outcomes given
the settings, whereas in the second case λ determines the outcomes as well as the settings.
• In Bohmian mechanics the hidden variable is position x, and dµψ = |ψ(x)|2dx is the
Born probability for outcome x with respect to the expansion |ψ〉 = ∫ dxψ(x)|x〉.30
• Similarly, in ’t Hooft’s theory the hidden state n is identified with a basis vector |n〉
in some Hilbert space H, and once again the measure µψ(n) = |cn|2 is given by the
Born probability for outcome n with respect to the expansion |ψ〉 = ∑n cn|n〉.
In Bohmian mechanics (’t Hooft does not need this!) such averaging also restores (surface)
signal-locality, i.e., the impossibility of superluminal communication on the basis of actual
measurement outcomes (which is a theorem of quantum theory, though a much more
delicate one than is usually thought, as I will argue in §5), see also Valentini (2002).
28This is often called Parameter Independence, as in e.g. the standard textbook by Bub (1997).
29This assumption even makes sense in a super-deterministic theory, where the settings are not free. See
Cator & Landsman (2014) or Landsman (2017), Chapter 6, for a discussion of this point as well as for a
unified view of both Bell’s Theorem (from 1964) and the Free Will Theorem of Conway and Kochen.
30Bohmians call this choice of µψ the quantum equilibrium condition. It was first written down by Pauli.
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4 Probabilistic preliminaries
‘O False and treacherous Probability,
Enemy of truth, and friend to wickednesse;
With whose bleare eyes Opinion learnes to see,
Truth’s feeble party here, and barrennesse.
When thou hast thus misled Humanity,
And lost obedience in the pride of wit,
With reason dar’st thou judge the Deity,
And in thy flesh make bold to fashion it.
Vaine thoght, the word of Power a riddle is,
And till the vayles be rent, the flesh newborne,
Reveales no wonders of that inward blisse,
Which but where faith is, every where findes scorne;
Who therfore censures God with fleshly sp’rit,
As well in time may wrap up infinite
Philip Sidney (1554–1586), Cœlica, Sonnet CIV.31
My aim is to give a critical assessment of the situation described in the previous section.
My analysis is based on the interplay between the single-case probability measure µ on an
outcome space X, which for the purpose of this paper will be the Born measure µ = µa on
the spectrum X = σ(a) of some self-adjoint operator a, and hence are provided by theory
(see also Appendix A), and the probabilities defined as long-run frequencies for outcome
sequences x = (x1, x2, . . .) of the Bernoulli process defined by (X,µ), which are given by
experiment. To obtain clean mathematical results, I assume experiments can be repeated
infinitely often. This is clearly an idealization, which is regulated by Earman’s Principle:
‘While idealizations are useful and, perhaps, even essential to progress in
physics, a sound principle of interpretation would seem to be that no effect
can be counted as a genuine physical effect if it disappears when the idealiza-
tions are removed.’ (Earman, 2004, p. 191)
Indeed, finite-size effects would confirm the picture I sketch (see Appendix B), much as the
law(s) of large numbers have finite-size approximants like the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound.
In particular, zero probability of some infinite sequence comes down to very low probability
for the corresponding finite strings, and probability 1 for infinite sequences amounts to
very high probability for finite strings.32 Thus I use the canonical probability measure µ∞
on the infinite product space XN of all infinite sequences x = (x1, x2, . . .), where xn ∈ X,
and XN are canonically equipped with the cylindrical σ-algebra S ⊂ P(XN).33
31The first four lines of this poem are printed on the last page of Keynes (1921), without any source.
32One has to distinguish between outcomes with probability zero and properties that hold with proba-
bility zero. Indeed, every single outcome (in the sense of an infinite bitstream produced by a fair quantum
coin flip) has probability zero, and hence this property alone cannot distinguish between random outcomes
(in whatever sense, e.g. 1-random) and non-random outcomes (such as deterministic outcomes, or, more
appropriately in our technical setting, computable ones), or indeed between any kind of different outcomes.
On the other hand, not being random is a property that holds with probability zero, in that the set of all
outcomes that are not random has probability zero (equivalently, the event consisting of all outcomes that
are random happens almost surely, i.e. with probability 1). And yet outcomes with this probability zero
property exist and may occur (in the finite case, with very small but positive probability). See also §5.
33 Here P(Y ) denotes the power set of Y . The σ-algebra S is generated by all subsets of the form
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To see how one may recover or verify µ from the long-term frequencies governed by
the product measure µ∞, for any function f : X → R, define f (N) : XN → R by
f (N)(x1, . . . , xN ) =
1
N
(f(x1) + · · ·+ f(xN )). (4.1)
Then (by the ergodic theorem), for any f ∈ C(X), almost surely with respect to µ∞,
lim
N→∞
f (N) = 〈f〉µ ≡
∫
X
dµ(x) f(x), (4.2)
times the unit function 1XN onX
N. This is for continuous functions f , but a limit argument
extends it to characteristic functions 1A : X → 2 ≡ {0, 1}, where A ⊂ X, so that
lim
N→∞
1
(N)
A = µ(A), (4.3)
times 1XN , again µ
∞-almost surely. If we define the ‘probability’ of A within some infinite
sequence (x1, x2, . . .) as the relative frequency of A, i.e., as the limit as N → ∞ of the
number of xn within (x1, . . . , xN ) that lie in A divided by N , then (4.3) states that
for almost all sequences in XN with respect to the infinite product measure µ∞ this
‘probability’ of A equals its Born probability. This is useful, since the latter is a purely
mathematical quantity, whereas the former is experimentally accessible (at least for large
N).
In what follows, I specialize this setting to a fair coin flip, that is, X = 2 = {0, 1} and
µ(0) = µ(1) = 1/2. Hence 2N is the space of infinite binary sequences, equipped with the
probability measure µ∞ induced by µ (as I shall argue in §5 below, this situation cannot
in fact arise classically, at least not in a deterministic theory). We have:
Theorem 4.1 Almost every binary sequence x ∈ 2N is 1-random with respect to µ∞.
See e.g. Calude (2010), Corollary 6.32. Thus the set E of all sequences that are not 1-
random has probability zero, i.e. µ∞(E) = 0, but this by no means implies that E is
“small” in any other sense: set-theoretically, it is as large as its complement, i.e. the set of
all 1-random sequences, which makes it bizarre that (barring a few exceptions related to
Chaitin’s number Ω) not a single one of these 1-random sequences can actually be proved
to be 1-random, cf. Appendix B. Theorem 4.1 has further amazing consequences:
Corollary 4.2 With respect to µ∞, almost every infinite outcome sequence x of a fair coin
flip is Borel normal,34 incomputable,35 and contains any finite string infinitely often.36
This follows because any 1-random sequence has these properties with certainty, see Calude
(2010), §6.4. The relevance of Bernoulli processes for quantum theory comes from Theorem
5.1 in the next section, whose second option almost by definition yields these processes.
B =
∏N
n=1 An ×
∏∞
m=N+1X, where An ⊂ X is Borel measurable and N <∞. The probability measure µ
on X then defines a probability measure µ∞ on S , whose value on B is defined by µ∞(B) =
∏N
n=0 µ(An).
See e.g. Dudley (1989), especially Theorem 8.2.2, for this and related constructions (due to Kolmogorov).
34This means that any group x1 · · ·xn of digits in x occurs with relative frequency equal to 2
−n.
35This means that there is no computable function f : N → N taking values in {0, 1} that produces x,
where computability is meant in the old sense of recursion theory, or, equivalently, in the sense of Turing
machines or indeed modern computers. One could also say that there is no algorithm for f .
36This is a strong version of the “infinite monkey (typewriter) theorem”, to the effect that if some
monkey randomly hits the keys of a typewriter for a very long time, the probability that it produces a play
by Shakespeare (or whatever other canonical text) is positive. See also the “Boltzmann Brain argument.”
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5 Critical analysis and claims
The relevance of the material in the previous section comes from the following result.
Theorem 5.1 The following procedures for repeated identical measurements are equiva-
lent (in giving the same possible outcome sequences with the same probabilities):
1. Quantum mechanics is applied to the whole run (with classically recorded outcomes).
2. Quantum mechanics is just applied to single experiments (with classically recorded
outcomes), upon which classical probability theory takes over to combine these.
See Appendix A for the proof, which culminates in eq. (A.35), showing that the Born
probability µa for single outcomes induces the Bernoulli process probability µ
∞
a on the
space σ(a)N of infinite outcome sequences. As mentioned before, I specialize to fair quan-
tum coin flips producing 50-50 Bernoulli processes, of which there are examples galore:
think of measuring the third Pauli matrix σz = diag(1,−1) in a state like ψ = (1, 1)/
√
2.
In that case, Theorem 5.1 and Corollary 4.2 trivially have the following implication:
Corollary 5.2 With respect to the product measure µ∞a coming from the Born measure
µa, almost every infinite outcome sequence x of a fair quantum coin flip is 1-random and
therefore Borel normal, incomputable, and contains any finite string infinitely often.
The Born rule therefore implies very strong randomness properties of outcome sequences,
albeit merely with probability one (i.e. almost surely) with respect to µ∞a . This makes it
pointless to try and prove that outcome sequences of quantummeasurements are 1-random:
firstly, many sequences are not, and secondly, of those that are, the property is (generically)
unprovable.37 In any case, in the spirit of our general philosophy of randomness it is natural
to compare randomness of infinite measurement outcome sequences as defined by:38
1. 1-randomness (with compressible sequences as its anti-pole), as suggested by the
Born rule and the above analysis of its mathematical implications;39
2. indeterminism, as suggested by Born himself, and in his wake also by Bell’s Theorem
and the Free Will Theorem (seen as proofs of indeterminism under assumptions 1–3).
To make this comparison precise, we once again need the case distinction between hidden
variable theories giving up hidden signal-locality like Bohmian mechanics and those giving
up free will, like ’t Hooft’s theory. In the usual EPR–Bohm–Bell setting, let (x, y) be the
outcome for given settings (a, b) ∈ k×k (assuming each setting can take k possible values,
typically k = 2 or k = 3), where (x, a) are Alice’s and (y, b) are Bob’s (outcomes, settings).
37See Abbott et al (2019) and Kovalsky et al (2018) for empirical tests of approximate 1-randomness.
38In the literature on quantum cryptography and quantum random number generators (QRNG) one also
find notions of (“free”) randomness for single qubits, see e.g. the reviews Brunner et al (2019), Herrero-
Collantes & Garcia-Escartin (2017), Ma et al (2016), and Pironio (2018). The two (closely related)
definitions used there fall into our general scheme of anti-polarity, namely randomness as unpredictability
defined as minimizing the probability that an eavesdropper correctly guesses the qubit, and randomness as
the absence of correlations between the qubit in question and anything outside its forward lightcone (which
is heavily Leibnizian). These are related, since guessing is done through such correlations of the qubit.
Certification of both cryptographic protocols and QRNGs is defined in these terms, backed by proofs of
indeterminism a` la Bell, so that in all versions non-locality plays a crucial role.
39I am by no means the first to relate quantum theory to algorithmic randomness: see, for example,
Bendersky et al (2014, 2016, 2017), Calude (2004), Svozil (1993, 2018), Senno (2017), Yurtsever (2001),
and Zurek (1989). The way my work relates to some of these references will become clear in due course.
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• In Bohmian mechanics, narrowed down to the above context, one may regard the
hidden state λ ∈ Λ as a function λ(a, b) = (x, y) that determines the outcome
from the settings, which are supposed to be “freely chosen”, and hence are given
independently of λ. If we number the consecutive runs of the experiment by n ∈
N = {1, 2, . . .}, then the outcome sequence is determined by some function
f : N→ Λ× k × k; (5.1)
n 7→ (λn, an, bn) (5.2)
that gives the value λn ∈ Λ of the hidden state as well as the settings (an, bn), from
which the outcome (xn, yn) follows. It will be useful to split f = (f1, f2) into two
parts, where λn = f1(n) for some f1 : N→ Λ, and likewise (an, bn) = f2(n).
• In ’t Hooft’s theory, λ determines all of (a, b, x, y) = (a(λ), b(λ), x(λ), y(λ)), but the
settings (a, b) do not determine the outcome (x, y); one needs to know λ for this. In
this case, the outcome sequence is therefore simply determined by a function
g : N→ Λ; (5.3)
n 7→ λn. (5.4)
A key point in the analysis of these functions f and g is the requirement that both theories
reproduce the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics given through the Born rule
relative to some pure state ψ. As already noted, this is achieved by requiring that λ
is averaged with respect to some probability measure µψ on Λ. If the experimental run
is to respect this averaging, as it has to if its long-run frequencies are to reproduce the
quantum-mechanical ones, then the maps f1 and g must be ‘typical’ for the Born-like
measure µψ (cf. Du¨rr, Goldstein, & Zanghi, 1992; Callender, 2007; Norsen, 2018) which
seems to mean that (the range of) f1 and g should pass sufficiently many statistical tests
based on µψ (such as the law of large numbers). Technically, I would say that the samplings
from Λ must be 1-random, assuming we use the tests used in the second definition of 1-
randomness in §2, which include all the usual ones (Li & Vita´nyi, 2008, §2.4).40 Anything
deterministic, like computable samplings, will only contribute output sequences that are
atypical for µψ: even the set of all such sequences has measure zero.
41
The requirement that the functions f1 and g randomly sample µψ necessarily introduces
an element of randomness into the hidden variable theories in question, which seems
somewhat at odds with their deterministic character. Indeed, there are two possibilities:
• This sampling is provided by the hidden variable theory. In that case, the above
argument shows that the theory must contain an irreducibly random ingredient.
• The sampling is not provided by the theory. In that case, the theory fails to deter-
mine the outcome of any specific experiment and just provides averages of outcomes.
40We only defined 1-randomness for outcome sequences of fair coin flips, but the definition can be
extended to other measures, see Downey & Hirschfeldt (2010), §6.12 and references therein.
41 In this light I draw attention to an important result of Senno (2017), Theorem 3.2.7, see also Bendersky
et al (2017), which is entirely consistent with the above analysis: If the functions f1 and g are computable
(within a computable time bound), then Alice and Bob can signal superluminally. In other words, where
mathematically speaking averaging the hidden state over the probability measure µψ suffices to guarantee
(surface) signal-locality even in a theory without hidden signal-locality (Valantini, 2002), if this averaging
is done by sampling Λ in a long run of repeated measurements, then this sampling must at least be
incomputable. If not, the mathematical averaging is not reproduced, to one’s detriment.
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Either way, like standard (Copenhagen Interpretation) quantum mechanics the hidden
variable theory cannot be deterministic, and the question is what has been gained. Surely,
the source of indeterminism has been shifted: in Copenhagen quantum mechanics it is in
the outcomes of experiments whereas in ‘deterministic’ hidden variable theories it is in
the assignment of the hidden variable to each run of the experiment, i.e. in the sampling
of the Born-like measure µψ, but since in both Bohmian mechanics and ’t Hooft’s theory
this measure literally is the Born measure while in Copenhagen quantum mechanics the
outcomes of experiments equally well sample the Born measure, the difference between
the two cases is almost metaphysical. Therefore, it would be fair to say that
truly deterministic hidden variable theories compatible with the Born rule do not exist.
It is instructive to compare this with classical coin tossing, in which the role of the hidden
state is played by the initial conditions (cf. Diaconis & Skyrms, 2018, Chapter 1, Appendix
2). The 50-50 chances making the coin fair should be obtained by averaging over the initial
conditions, i.e., by sampling with respect to a suitable probability distribution. By the
above argument, this sampling cannot be done deterministically, for otherwise the outcome
sequences appropriate to a fair coin do not obtain: it must be done in a genuinely random
way. This is impossible classically, so that fair classical coins do not exist (as confirmed
by the experiments of Diaconis c.s., see Diaconis & Skyrms (2018), Chapter 1).
In response to this argument, both the Bohmians and ’t Hooft go for the second option
and blame the randomness in question on the initial conditions,42 whose specification is
indeed usually seen as lying outside the range of a deterministic theory.43 As explained
by both parties (Du¨rr, Goldstein, & Zanghi, 1992; ’t Hooft, 2016), the randomness in the
outcomes of measurement on quantum system, including the Born rule, is a direct con-
sequence of the above randomness in initial conditions. But in a Laplacian deterministic
theory one can either predict or retrodict and these procedures should be equivalent; so
within the context of a deterministic hidden variable theory of the kinds under discussion,
Copenhagen attributing the origin of randomness to the outcomes of measurement and
our hidden variable theorists attributing it to the initial conditions for measurement, are
equivalent. This makes it impossible to regard the hidden variable theories in question as
deterministic underpinnings of (Copenhagen) quantum mechanics, as they are intended.44
Bohmians (but not ’t Hooft) even have an additional problem, namely the function
f2 : N → n × n that provides the measurement settings. This is left outside the theory,
but Bohmians still have to account for both the ‘freedom’ of choosing these settings and
their randomness (which for example is used in all arguments around Bell’s Theorem, cf.
Esfeld, 2015). Bell tried to kill two birds with the same stone by saying that the settings
had to be ‘at least effectively free for the purpose at hand’, and clarifying this as follows:45
42Indeed, N runs of the same experiment need not be done subsequently but can be done simultaneously.
43The Bohmians seem to be split on the origin of the quantum equilibrium distribution, compare e.g.
Du¨rr, Goldstein, & Zanghi (1992) with Colin & Valentini (2014). See also Callender (2007) and Norsen
(2018). Let me emphasize that the origin of µψ or its dependence on µΨ is not my concern here; the
problem I address is the need to randomly sample it and the justification for doing so.
44A different point was made by Pauli (1953, p. 38) against the pilot wave theory of De Broglie: ‘The
hypothesis of a general probability distribution for the hidden variables that is determined by the single
[wave] function ψ is not justified from the point of view of a deterministic scheme: it is borrowed from
a theory which is based on the totally different hypothesis that the [wave] function provides a complete
description of the system.’ I am indebted to Anthony Valentini and Guido Bacciagaluppi for this reference.
45The source is Bell (1985), p. 105, which corresponds to p. 86 of the reprinted version in Bell, Gottfried,
and Veltman (2001). The author learnt it from the talk by Tim Maudlin at the ’t Hooft 2019 conference.
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‘Suppose that the instruments are set at the whim, not of experimental physi-
cists, but of mechanical random generators. (. . . ) Could the input of such
mechanical devices be reasonably be regarded as sufficiently free for the pur-
pose at hand? I think so. Consider the extreme case of a “random” generator
which is in fact perfectly deterministic in nature and, for simplicity, perfectly
isolated. In such a device the complete final state perfectly determines the
complete initial state–nothing is forgotten. And yet for many purposes, such a
device is precisely a “forgetting machine”. (. . . ) To illustrate the point, sup-
pose that the choice between two possible [settings], corresponding to a and
a′, depended on the oddness of evenness of the digit in the millionth decimal
place of some input variable. Then fixing a or a′ indeed fixes something about
the input–i.e., whether the millionth digit is odd or even. But this peculiar
piece of information is unlikely to be the vital piece for any distinctly different
purpose, i.e., it is otherwise rather useless. (. . . ) In this sense the output of
such a device is indeed a sufficiently free variable for the purpose at hand.’
In view of von Neumann’s warning about mechanical (i.e. pseudo) random generators:
‘Any one who considers arithmetical methods of producing random digits is,
of course, in a state of sin’ (von Neumann, 1951),
see also Markowsky (2014), Bell’s statement was questionable already at the time of writ-
ing, but today we know for sure that mechanical random generators leave a loophole in
the EPR–Bohm–Bell experiment: as soon as just one of the functions defining the settings
(i.e. either of Alice or of Bob) is computable,46 there is a model that is local (in the sense
of Bell). See Bendersky et al (2016) or Senno (2017), Theorem 2.2.1 This implies that
Bohmian mechanics (as well as other deterministic hidden variable theories that leaves the
settings free) requires even more randomness than the sampling of the (Born) probability
measure µψ, which further undermines the claim that it is a deterministic theory.
The analysis given so far focused on the necessity of correctly sampling a probability
measure µ: if, so far in the context of hidden variable theories, where µ = µψ, this is not
done correctly, quantum-mechanical predictions such as signal-locality may be threatened.
But in general there are measurement outcome sequences that fail to sample µ: events
with very low or even zero probability can and do occur. This is even the whole point of
the “law of truly large numbers” quoted in §2, which is true for infinite sequences, but
may be clearer for (very) long finite sequences, where (in the spirit of Earman’s Principle)
zero probability is replaced by very low probability. In general, the no-signaling (or signal-
locality) property of quantum mechanics states that the probability
Pψ(x | a, b) :=
∑
y
Pψ(x, y | a, b) (5.5)
is independent of b, where Pψ(x, y | a, b) is the Born probability that measurement of
observables determined by the settings a and b give outcomes x and y. Indeed, we have
Pψ(x | a, b) = Pψ|A(x | a), (5.6)
where ψ|A is the restriction of the state ψ on B(HA⊗HB) to Alice’s part B(HA). Similarly,
the Born probability Pψ(y | a, b) should be independent of a and in fact equals Pψ|B (y | b).
46The computable function is subject to a time bound, but this is true for all pseudo-random generators.
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However, I have repeatedly noted that the empirical probability extracted from a long
measurement outcome sequence coincides with the corresponding Born probability only
almost surely with respect to the induced probability measure on the space of outcome
sequences, and hence outliers violating the property (5.5) exist (for finite sequences even
with positive probability). If one such run is found, the door to superluminal signaling
is open, at least in principle. To see this, recall that the crudest form of determinism is
what is called predictability by Cavalcanti & Wiseman (2012), i.e. the property that
Pψ(x, y | a, b) ∈ {0, 1}. (5.7)
It is easy to show that the conjunction of predictability and signal-locality implies fac-
torization and hence, for random settings, the Bell (CHSH) inequalities, and therefore
for suitable states ψ this conjunction contradicts the statistical predictions of quantum
mechanics as expressed by the Born rule. Accepting the latter, signal-locality therefore
implies unpredictability and hence some (very weak) form of randomness. There are many
other results in this direction, ranging from e.g. Barrett, Kent, & Hardy (2005) to Wolf
(2015),47 involving varying definitions of randomness, all coming down to the implication
no signaling ⇒ randomness , (5.8)
assuming free choice or random settings.48 What I simply argue for is the contrapositive
no randomness ⇒ signaling . (5.9)
This argument is just heuristic, since the terms are used differently in both cases: to
prove (5.8) one typically uses Born probabilities and other theoretical entities, whereas for
(5.9) I use probabilities obtained from outcome sequences as limiting relative frequencies:
(5.9) then comes from low-probability sequences that violate (5.5), which is satisfied with
probability one by sufficiently random sequences. Indeed, this difference is the whole point:
signal-locality is a statistical property, like the second law of thermodynamics.49
47Note that the aim of Barrett, Kent, & Hardy (2005) is to prove security of some quantum key distri-
bution protocol on the basis of signal-locality even if quantum mechanics turns out to be incorrect, whereas
the present paper investigates the role of statistical outliers assuming quantum mechanics is correct. These
aims are closely related, of course, since too many (how many?) outliers may make one question the theory.
48See Hermens (2019) for arguments for (5.8) and (5.9) even without assuming free choice.
49 Having said this, giving an actual signaling protocol for an outcome sequence (in the EPR–Bohm–Bell
setting) that violates (5.5) is highly nontrivial. Yurtsever (2001) gives a protocol for superluminal signaling
if the outcome sequence is not 1-random, but his arguments are very hard to follow and the paper with
complete details he announces has never appeared. His approach may be neither viable nor necessary, since
such a protocol need only exist for outcome sequences violating (5.5), which is a stronger property than
violating 1-randomness–since contrapositively 1-randomness implies all averaging properties like (5.5). In
fact, further assumptions are necessary in order for Alice to have a chance (sic) to learn Bob’s settings b
from her part (xn)n of the (double) outcome sequence (xn, yn)n; a complete lack of structure would also
make any kind of signaling random. I know of only one such protocol (which, however, should suffice
as a “proof of concept”): if the unlikely outcome sequence (xn, yn)n comes from computable functions
xn = x(a, b, n) and yn = y(a, b, n) with O(T
2) time bounds, then signaling is possible through a learning
algorithm for computable functions, see Senno (2017), Theorem 3.2.7 and Bendersky et al (2017). This is
the same result as in footnote 41; by Proposition 3.1.7 in Senno (2017), mutatis mutandis it applies both
with and without hidden variables. This protocol enables Alice (or Bob) to signal after a finite (but alas
unknown and arbitrarily large) number of of measurements (this answers a speculation by Carlo Rovelli
that finite-size corrections to the lack of randomness may conspire to prevent superluminal signaling).
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A The Born rule revisited
Every argument on probabilities in quantum mechanics relies on the Born rule, which is
so natural that it will probably (!) be with us forever. In order to explain its canonical
mathematical origin, I use the C*-algebraic approach to quantum theory, which because of
its ability to simultaneously talk about commutative and non-commutative algebras (and
hence about classical and quantum probabilities) is especially useful in this context.50
Indeed, the Born rule arises by restricting a quantum state ω on the non-commutative
algebra B(H), i.e. the algebra of all bounded operators on some Hilbert space H, to the
commutative C*-algebra C∗(a) generated by some self-adjoint operator a = a∗ ∈ B(H)
and the unit operator 1H (so perhaps C
∗(a, 1H ) would have been better notation).
51
This view has been inspired by the Copenhagen Interpretation, in that the associated
probabilities originate in the classical description of a measurement setting, as called for
by Bohr. However, precisely because of this, my derivation also seems to undermine the
Copenhagen claim of the irreducibility of randomness, which may now clearly be traced
back to a voluntary loss of information in passing from an algebra to one of its subalgebras
and ignoring the rest (see also §3). The Copenhagen Interpretation will be saved from
this inconsistency by a mathematical property that has no classical analog.
As I see it, the Born rule is the quantum-mechanical counterpart of the following
elementary construction in measure theory. Let X be a compact Hausdorff space,52 with
associated commutative C*-algebra A = C(X) of complex-valued continuous functions on
X. Let f ∈ A be real-valued and denote its (automatically closed) range in R by σ(f); the
notation is justified by the fact that the spectrum of a self-adjoint operator in quantum
theory is analogous to σ(f) in every possible way. Let ω be a state on A, or, equivalently
(by the Riesz representation theorem), a probability measure µ on X, related to ω by
ω(f) =
∫
X
dµ(x) f(x). (A.1)
The state ω then also defines a probability measure µf on the ‘spectrum’ σ(f) through
µf (∆) = µ(f ∈ ∆), (A.2)
where ∆ ⊆ σ(f) and f ∈ ∆ or f−1(∆) denotes the subset {x ∈ X | f(x) ∈ ∆} of X.
Virtually all of probability theory is based on this construction, which I now rephrase.
For any C*-algebra A with unit 1A, let C
∗(a) be the smallest C*-algebra in A (under the
same operations and norm) that contains a and the unit 1A, as above for A = B(H). If
a∗ = a, then C∗(a) is the norm-closure of the set of all (finite) polynomials in a. Take
A = C(X) and f ∈ C(X), assumed real-vaued (since f∗ = f). This gives as isomorphism
C(σ(f))
∼=→ C∗(f); (A.3)
g 7→ g ◦ f, (A.4)
where f ∈ C(X), g ∈ C(σ(f)), as follows from the Stone–Weierstrass Theorem.53
50See e.g. Haag (1992), Ruetsche (2011), or Landsman (2017) for the C*-algebraic approach. My dis-
cussion of the Born rule is partly taken from the latter, which in turn elaborates on Landsman (2009), but
the corresponding ‘classical’ construction has been added and may be new; I find it very instructive.
51This is well defined, since C∗(a) is just the intersection of all C*-algebras in A that contain a and 1A.
52With some modifications the construction easily generalizes to the locally compact case.
53 if K ⊂ R is compact, then polynomials on K are dense in C(K) for the supremum-norm, i.e. the
norm on C(X). To prove that (A.3) - (A.4) is an isomorphism of C*-algebras one may therefore start with
polynomial functions g (taking K = σ(f)) and finish with a continuity argument.
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If C is a C*-subalgebra of A with the same unit as A, then any state ω on A defines
a state ω|C on C. Thus ω|C∗(f) is a state on C
∗(f). Furthermore, if ϕ : B → C is a
unital homomorphism of unital C*-algebras (i.e., a linear map preserving all operations
as well as the unit—in our case ϕ is even an isomorphism), and if ω′ is a state on C, then
ϕ∗ω
′ = ω′ ◦ ϕ is a state on B. Using (A.3) - (A.4), I apply this construction to
A = C(X), B = C(σ(f)), C = C∗(f); (A.5)
ω ∈ S(C(X)), ω′ = ω|C∗(f), ϕ(g) = g ◦ f, (A.6)
where S(A) is the state space of A, so that a state ω on C(X) defines a state ω′ on C(σ(f)).
Once again using the Riesz representation theorem then turns ω′ into a probability measure
µ′ on σ(f); and this is exactly the probability measure µf = µ
′ defined in (A.2).
Copying this reasoning for quantum mechanics mutatis mutandis immediately gives
the Born measure. Instead of (A.5) - (A.6), for some given a = a∗ ∈ B(H) I now take
A = B(H), B = C(σ(a)), C = C∗(a); (A.7)
ω ∈ S(B(H)), ω′ = ω|C∗(a), ϕ(g) = g(a), (A.8)
where (A.3) - (A.4) is replaced by the continuous functional calculus (CFC), that is,
C(σ(a))
∼=→ C∗(a); (A.9)
g 7→ g(a). (A.10)
Here σ(a) is the spectrum of a, defined as the set of λ ∈ C for which the operator a−λ ·1H
is not invertible in B(H); if dim(H) <∞, then σ(a) is the set of eigenvalues of a. In most
applications the state ω is normal, i.e., given by a density operator ρ on H through
ω(a) = Tr (ρa). (A.11)
We then replay our record: a state ω ∈ S(B(H)) restricts to a state ω|C∗(a) on C∗(a),
which is mapped to a state on C(σ(a)) by the CFC, which state in turn is equivalent to a
probability measure on σ(a). The probability measure µa on σ(a) obtained by the above
construction is exactly the Born measure, which is more commonly defined as follows:
Theorem A.1 Let H be a Hilbert space, let a∗ = a ∈ B(H), and let ω be a state on
B(H). There exists a unique probability measure µa on the spectrum σ(a) such that
ω(g(a)) =
∫
σ(a)
dµa(λ) g(λ), g ∈ C(σ(a)). (A.12)
We now return to the issue raised in the introduction to this appendix: even short of hidden
variables (see §3), to what extent is the probabilistic structure of quantum mechanics that
is already inherent in the Born measure reducible to ignorance? From a naive perspective
it is, for in the corresponding classical case the measure µf on σ(f) does not determine
the measure µ on X except when C∗(f) = C(X) (which is certainly possible, take e.g.
X = [0, 1] and f(x) = x). However, in the quantum case it so happens that if a is maximal
(i.e. its spectrum is nondegenerate, or, equivalently, C∗(a) is a maximal commutative C*-
subalgebra of B(H)), then the measure µa on σ(a) does determine the state ω, at least
if ω is pure and normal, as in (A.11), despite the fact that C∗(a) is just a small part of
B(H). So the Copenhagen Interpretation is walking a tightrope here, but it doesn’t fall.54
54This discussion is closely related to the so-called Kadison–Singer conjecture in operator algebras, which
however is nontrivial only for non-normal states. See Stevens (2016) and Landsman (2017), §2.6 and §4.3
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The Born measure is a mathematical construction; what is its relationship to exper-
iment? This relationship must be the source of the (alleged) randomness of quantum
mechanics, for the Schro¨dinger equation is deterministic. We start by postulating, as
usual, that µa(A) is the (single case) probability that measurement of the observable a
in the state ω (that jointly give rise to the pertinent Born measure µa) gives a result
λ ∈ A ⊂ σ(a). What needs to be clarified in the above statement is the word ‘probability’.
Although I do not buy Lewis’s (1994) “Best Systems Account” (BSA) of laws of na-
ture,55 I do agree with his identification of single-case probabilities as numbers (consistent
with the probability calculus as a whole) that theory assigns to events, upon which long-
run frequencies provide empirical evidence for the theory in question,56 but do not define
probabilities.57 The Born measure is a case in point: these probabilities are theoretically
given, but have to be empirically verified by long runs of independent experiments. In
other words, by the results reviewed below such experiments provide numbers whose role
it is to test the Born rule as a hypothesis. This is justified by (4.3) in §4, which equates
probabilities computed from long-run frequencies with the corresponding single-case prob-
abilities that define the clause “with probability one” under which (4.3) holds, and without
which clause the limit in (4.3) would be undefined. As explained in §§4-5, the relevance
of (4.3) to quantum physics comes from Theorem 5.1, which I now prove.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Let a = a∗ ∈ B(H), where H is a Hilbert space and B(H) is the
algebra of all bounded operators on H, and let σ(a) be the spectrum of a. For simplicity
(and since this is enough for our applications, where H = C2) I assume dim(H) < ∞, so
that σ(a) simply consists of the eigenvalues λi of a (which may be degenerate). Let us
first consider a finite number N of runs of an identical measurement of a. The first option
in the theorem corresponds to a simultaneous measurement of the commuting operators
a1 = a⊗ 1H ⊗ · · · ⊗ 1H ; (A.13)
· · ·
aN = 1H ⊗ · · · ⊗ 1H ⊗ a, (A.14)
all defined on the N -fold tensor product HN ≡ H⊗N of H with itself.58 To put this in
a broader perspective, consider any set (a1, . . . , aN ) ≡ a of commuting operators on any
Hilbert space K (of which (A.13) - (A.14) is obviously a special case with K = HN ).
These operators have a joint spectrum σ(a), whose elements are the joint eigenvalues
λ = (λ1, . . . , λN ), defined by the property that there exists a nonzero joint eigenvector
ψ ∈ K such that aiψ = λiψ for all i = 1, . . . , N ; clearly,
σ(a) = {λ ∈ σ(a1)× · · · × σ(an) | eλ ≡ e(1)λ1 · · · e
(n)
λn
6= 0} ⊆ σ(a1)× · · · × σ(aN ), (A.15)
55See Loewer (2004) and, concisely, Callender(2007) for summaries of Lewis’s BSA. As I understand it,
Lewisian laws describe nature, but fail to govern or guide it in the way that the Law of Moses, carved
in stone, is supposed to influence (decent) human behaviour. Now I agree with Loewer (2004) that it is
hard to see how laws as mathematical expressions in physics books could govern anything, but I expect
this problem to be solved in due course by an emergentist account in which lower-level behaviour–though
never fundamental–gives rise to emergent laws at some higher substratum of reality. See also footnote 3.
56Within the Lewisian ideology this is ultimately justified by his Principal Principle, which roughly
speaking equates chance as subjective degree of belief (i.e. credence) with objective chance.
57This, as is well known by now, is a dead end street (Ha´jek & Hitchcock, 2016). It should be mentioned
though that the fascinating yet ultimately flawed attempts of von Mises to provide such a definition played
a decisive role in the road towards algorithmic randomness (van Lambalgen, 1987).
58This can even be replaced by a single measurement, see Landsman (2017), Corollary A.20.
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where e
(i)
λi
is the spectral projection of ai on the eigenspace for the eigenvalue λi ∈ σ(ai).
Von Neumann’s Born rule for the probability of finding λ ∈ σ(a) then simply reads
pa(λ) = ω(eλ), (A.16)
where ω is the state on B(K) with respect to which the Born probability is defined. If
dim(K) < ∞, as I assume, we always have ω(a) = Tr (ρa) for some density operator ρ,
and for a general Hilbert space K this is the case iff the state ω is normal on B(K). For
(normal) pure states we have ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ| for some unit vector ψ ∈ K, in which case
pa(λ) = 〈ψ, eλψ〉. (A.17)
The Born rule (A.16) follows from the same reasoning as the single-operator case explained
in the run-up to Theorem A.1 (Landsman, 2017, §4.1):59 we have an isomorphism
C∗(a) ∼= C(σ(a)) (A.18)
of (commutative) C*-algebras, and under this isomorphism the restriction of the state
ω, originally defined on B(K), to C∗(a) defines a probability measure µa on the joint
spectrum σ(a), which is just the Born measure whose probabilities are given by (A.16).
For (A.13) - (A.14) we have equality in (A.15); since in that case σ(ai) = σ(a), we obtain
σ(a) = σ(a)N , (A.19)
and, for all λi ∈ σ(a) and states ω on B(HN ), the Born rule (A.16) becomes
pa(λ1, . . . , λN ) = ω(eλ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ eλN ). (A.20)
Now take a given state ω1 on B(H). Reflecting the idea that ω is the state on B(H
N ) in
which N independent measurements of a ∈ B(H) in the state ω1 are carried out, choose
ω = ωN1 , (A.21)
the state on B(HN ) defined by linear extension of its action on elementary tensors:
ωN1 (b1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ bn) = ω1(b1) · · ·ωN (bN ). (A.22)
It follows that
ωN (eλ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ eλN ) = ω1(eλ1) · · ·ω1(eλN ) = pa(λ1) · · · pa(λN ), (A.23)
so that the joint probability of the outcome (λ1, . . . , λN ) ∈ σ(a) is simply
p~a(λ1, . . . , λN ) = pa(λ1) · · · pa(λN ). (A.24)
Since these are precisely the probabilities for option 2 (i.e. the Bernoulli process), i.e.,
µa = µ
N
a , (A.25)
this proves the claim for N <∞.
59Moreover, quite apart from te above derivation, the Born rule for multiple commuting operators is in
fact a special case of the one for single operators (Landsman, 2017, §2.5).
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To describe the limit N → ∞, let B be any C*-algebra with unit 1B ; below I take
B = B(H), B = C∗(a), or B = C(σ(a)). We now take
AN = B
⊗N , (A.26)
the N -fold tensor product of B with itself.60 The special cases above may be rewritten as
B(H)⊗N ∼= B(H ⊗ · · · ⊗H); (A.27)
C∗(a)⊗N ∼= C∗(a1, . . . , aN ); (A.28)
C(σ(a))⊗N ∼= C(σ(a)× · · · × σ(a)), (A.29)
with N copies of H and σ(a), respectively, and in (A.28) the ai are given by (A.13) -
(A.14).
We may then wonder if these algebras have a limit as N → ∞. They do, but it is
not unique and depends on the choice of observables, that is, of the infinite sequences
a = (a1, a2, . . .), with aN ∈ AN , that are supposed to have a limit. One possibility is to
take sequences a for which there exists M ∈ N and aM ∈ AM such that for each N ≥M ,
aN = aM ⊗ 1B · · · ⊗ 1B , (A.30)
with N −M copies of the unit 1B . On that choice, one obtains the infinite tensor product
B⊗∞, see Landsman (2017), §C.14. The limit of (A.27) in this sense is B(H⊗∞), where
H⊗∞ is von Neumann’s ‘complete’ infinite tensor product of Hilbert spaces,61 in which
C∗(a)⊗∞ is the C*-algebra generated by the operators (a1, a2, . . .). The limit of (A.29) is
C(σ(a))⊗∞ ∼= C(σ(a)N), (A.31)
where σ(a)N, which we previously saw as a measure space (as a special case of XN for
general compact Hausdorff spaces X), is now seen as a topological space with the product
topology, in which it is compact.62 As in the finite case, we have an isomorphism
C∗(a)⊗∞ ∼= C(σ(a))⊗∞, (A.32)
and hence, on the given identifications,
C∗(a1, a2, . . .) ∼= C(σ(a)N). (A.33)
It follows from the definition of the infinite tensor products used here that each state ω1
on B defines a state ω∞1 on B
⊗∞. Take B = B(H) and restrict ω∞1 , which a priori is
a state on B(H⊗∞), to its commutative C*-subalgebra C∗(a1, a2, . . .). The isomorphism
(A.33) then gives a probability measure µa on the compact space σ(a)
N, where the label
a now refers to the infinite set of commuting operators (a1, a2, . . .) on H
⊗∞. To compute
this measure, I use (A.12) and the fact that by construction functions of the type
f(λ1, λ2, . . .) = f
(N)(λ1, . . . , λN ), (A.34)
where N <∞ and f (N) ∈ C(σ(a)N ), are dense in C(σ(a)N) (with respect to the appropri-
ate supremum-norm), and that in turn finite linear combinations of factorized functions
f (N)(λ1, . . . , λN ) = f1(λ1) · · · fN (λN ) are dense in C(σ(a)N ). It follows from this that
µa = µ
∞
a . (A.35)
Since this generalizes (A.25) to N =∞, this finishes the proof of Theorem 5.1. 
60If B is infinite-dimensional, for technical reasons the so-called projective tensor product should be used.
61See Landsman (2017), §8.4 for this approach. The details are unnecessary here.
62Cf. Tychonoff’s Theorem. The associated Borel structure is the one defined in footnote 33 in §5.
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B 1-Randomness
As we have seen, randomness (of measurement outcomes) in quantum mechanics was
originally defined by Born as indeterminism. This is what hidden variable theories like
’t Hooft’s and Bohmian mechanics challenge, to which in turn Bell’s Theorem and the
Free Will Theorem (read in a specific way a` la Cator & Landsman, 2014) provide ob-
stacles. Indeterminism is a physical definition of randomness, which in mathematics is
most closely matched by incomputability. However, there is a much deeper notion of ran-
domness in mathematics, which is what at least in my view quantum mechanics should
aspire to produce. This notion, now called 1-randomness, has its roots in Hilbert’s sixth
problem, viz. the Mathematical Treatment of the Axioms of Physics,63 which was taken
up independently and very differently by von Mises (1919) and by Kolmogorov (1933).
Von Mises was a strict frequentist for whom probability was a derived concept, predi-
cated on first having a good notion of a random sequence from which relative frequencies
defining probability could be extracted. Kolmogorov, on the other hand, started from
an axiomatic a priori notion of probability from which a suitable mathematical concept
of randomness was subsequently to be extracted. Despite the resounding and continuing
success of the first step, Kolmogorov’s initial failure to achieve the follow-up led to his
later notion of algorithmic randomness, which (subject to a technical improvement) was
to become one of the three equivalent definitions of 1-randomness. In turn, von Mises’s
failure to adequately define random sequences eventually led to the other two.64
Kolmogorov’s problem, which was noticed already by Laplace and perhaps even earlier
probabilists, was that, specializing to a 50-50 Bernoulli process for simplicity,65 any binary
string σ of length N has probability P (σ) = 2−N and any (infinite) binary sequence x
has probability P (x) = 0, although say σ = 0011010101110100 looks much more random
than σ = 111111111111111. In other words, their probabilities say little or nothing about
the “randomness” of individual outcomes. Imposing statistical properties helps but is not
enough to guarantee randomness. It is slightly easier to explain this in base 10, to which
I therefore switch for a moment. If we call a sequence x Borel normal if each possible
string σ in x has (asymptotic) frequency 10−|σ| (so that each digit 0, . . . , 9 occurs 10% of
the time, each block 00 to 99 occurs 1% of the time, etc., then Champernowne’s number
0123456789101112131415161718192021222324252629282930 . . .
can be shown to be Borel normal. The decimal expansion of pi is conjectured to be Borel
normal, too (and has been empirically verified to be so in billions of decimals), but these
numbers are hardly random: they are computable, which is an anti-pole to randomness.
Von Mises’s problem was that his definition of a random sequence (called a Kollektiv),
despite his great insights, simply did not work. Back to binary sequences, his notion
of randomness was supposed to guarantee the existence of limiting relative frequencies
(which in turn should define the corresponding single-case probabilities), but of course he
understood that a sequence like 01010101 · · · is not very random at all. His idea was that
limiting relative frequencies should exist not only for the given sequence, but also for all
its permutations defined by so-called place-selection functions, which he tried to find (in
vain) by precluding successful gambling strategies on the digits of the sequence.
63‘The investigations on the foundations of geometry suggest the problem to treat in the same manner,
by means of axioms, those physical sciences in which already today mathematics plays an important part;
in the first rank are the theory of probabilities and mechanics.’ See Gorban (2018) for a recent survey.
64See van Lambalgen (1987) or, for a lighter account, Diaconis & Skyrms (2018) for this history.
65A string σ is finite row of bits, whereas a sequence x is an infinite one. The length of a string σ is |σ|.
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Of the three equivalent definitions of 1-randomness already mentioned in §2, namely:
Incompressibility ; Patternlessness; Unpredictability,
the first may be said to go back to Kolmogorov’s struggle, whereas the other two originate
in later attempts by other mathematicians to improve the work of von Mises.66
Although there isn’t a single “correct” mathematical notion of randomness, the notion
of 1-randomness featured here stands out (and represents a consensus view) largely because
it can be defined in these three equivalent yet fairly different ways, each of which realizes
some basic intuition on randomness (of course defined through its obvious anti-pole!).
In what follows, these notions will be defined more precisely, followed by some of their
consequences.67 We assume basic familiarity with the notion of a computable function
f : N → N, which may technically be defined through recursion theory or equivalently
through Turing machines: a function is computable if it can be computed by a computer.
Incompressibility
The idea is that a string or sequence is random iff its shortest description is the sequence
itself, but the notion of a description has to made precise to avoid Berry’s paradox :
The Berry number is the smallest positive integer that cannot be described in
less than eighteen words.
The paradox, then, is that on the one hand this number must exist, since only finitely
many integers can be described in less than eighteen words and hence the set of such
numbers must have a lower bound, while on the other hand Berry’s number cannot exists
by its own definition. This is, of course, one of innumerable paradoxes of natural language,
which, like the liar’s paradox, will be seen to lead to an incompleteness theorem once the
notion of a description has been appropriately formalized in mathematics, as follows.68
The plain Kolmogorov complexity C(σ) of σ ∈ 2N is defined as the length (in bits)
of the shortest computer program (run on some fixed universal Turing machine U) that
computes σ. The choice of U affects this definition only up to an σ-independent constant.
For technical reasons (especially for defining the randomness of sequences) it is preferable
to work with prefix-free Turing machines T , whose domain D(T ) consists of a prefix-
free subset of 2∗, i.e., if σ ∈ D(T ) then στ /∈ D(T ) for any σ, τ ∈ 2∗, where στ is the
concatenation of σ and τ , as the notation suggests. This is also independent of U up
to a constant, and defines the the prefix-free Kolmogorov complexity K(σ) as the length
of the shortest program (run on some fixed universal prefix-free Turing machine U) that
computes σ. For fixed c ∈ N we then say that σ ∈ 2∗ is c-compressible if K(σ) < |σ|−c; of
course, this depends on U via K(σ), but nonetheless a simple counting argument shows:
66As mentioned and referenced in most literature in the next footnote, Kolmogorov’s work in the 1960s
on the first definition was predated by R. Solomonoff and matched by independent later work of G. Chaitin.
Key players around the other definitions were C.P. Schnorr and P. Martin-Lo¨f, respectively.
67In increasing order of technicality, readers interested in more detail are referred to Diaconis & Skyrms
(2018, Chapter 8), Terwijn (2016) or Volchan (2002) at a popular level, then Gru¨nwald & Vita´nyi (2008),
Dasgupta (2011), Downey et al (2006), or Muchnik et al (1998), then Li & Vita´nyi (2008) or Calude
(2010), and finally Downey & Hirschfeldt (2010). See also Baumeler et al (2017), Bendersky et al (2014),
Calude (2004), Eagle (2019), Earman (2004), Kamminga (2019), Senno (2017), Svozil (1993, 2018), Wolf
(2015), and Zurek (1989) for brief introductions to Kolmogorov randomness with applications to physics.
68We write 2N for the set of all binary strings σ of length |σ| = N ∈ N, and 2∗ = ∪N2
N for the set of
all binary strings. Finally, 2N denotes the set of all binary sequences x (which are infinite by convention).
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At least 2N − 2N−c+1 + 1 strings σ of length |σ| = N are not c-compressible.
Clearly, as σ grows and c > 0, these will form the overwhelming majority. Finally, σ is
Kolmogorov c-random if it is not c-compressible, i.e., if K(σ) ≥ |σ| − c, and Kolmogorov
random if it is not c-compressible for any c, that is, if one even has K(σ) ≥ |σ|. Since
K(σ) can at most be equal to the length of an efficient printing program plus the length
of σ, this simply means that σ is Kolmogorov random if
K(σ) ≈ |σ|, (B.1)
where ≈ means ‘up to a σ-independent constant’. Finally, if for a sequence x ∈ 2N I write
x|N for its initial segment of length N , then x is Kolmogorov–Chaitin random if
lim
N→∞
K(x|N )
N
= 1. (B.2)
Equivalently,69 a sequence x is Kolmogorov–Chaitin random if there exists c ∈ N such that
each truncation x|N satisfies K(x|N ) ≥ N − c. We may therefore note that randomness of
sequences, which I see as idealizations of finite strings, satisfies Earman’s principle (§4).
This definition of randomness of both finite strings and infinite sequences looks very
appealing, but in a way it is self-defeating, since although it is defined in terms of com-
putability, the complexity function K is not computable, and hence one cannot even
determine algorithmically if a finite string σ is random (let alone an infinite one).70
Moreover, Berry’s paradox strikes back through Chaitin’s incompleteness Theorem: For
any consistent, sound, and sufficiently rich formal system F (containing basic arithmetic)
there is a constant f such that the statement K(σ) > f cannot be proved in F for any
σ ∈ 2∗, although it is true for all (random) strings σ that satisfy K(σ) ≥ |σ| > f (and
there are infinitely many such strings, as the above counting argument shows). To get a
very rough idea of proof, let me just say that any proof in F of the sentence K(σ) > f
would identify σ and hence give a shorter description of σ than its complexity K(σ) allows.
Chaitin’s Theorem gives a new and inexhaustible class of unprovable but true state-
ments (which also lie in a very different class from those provided by Go¨del himself):
For almost all random strings their randomness cannot be proved.71
To the extent that there are deep logico-philosophical truths, surely this is one! Compare:
‘It may be taken for granted that any attempt at defining disorder in a formal
way will lead to a contradiction. This does not mean that the notion of disorder
is contradictory. It is so, however, as soon as I try to formalize it.’72
The satisfactory definition of 1-randomness proves this wrong, but the statement preceding
it is a correct version of a similar intuition: randomness is by its very nature elusive.
69See Calude (2010), Theorem 6.38 (attributed to Chaitin) for this equivalence.
70To see this, identify 2∗ ∼= N (in a computable way of course) and define a function L : N → N by
L(n) = min{m ∈ N | K(m) ≥ n}, the shortest string m (seen as an element of N) whose complexity K(m)
exceeds n, so that by construction K(L(n)) ≥ n. If K were computable, then so would L be. Suppose
T is the shortest prefix-free program that computes L. Since K(L(n)) is the length of shortest prefix-free
program that computes L(n), we have K(L(n)) ≤ |n| + |T |, where |n| is the length of σ under the above
bijection σ ↔ n, so that |n| ≈ 10log n. Thus n ≤ K(L(n)) ≤ |n|+ |T |, which cannot be true for large n.
71See Raatikainen (1998) for a detailed presentation of Chaitin’s incompleteness Theorem including a
devastating critique of the far-reaching philosophical interpretation Chaitin himself gave of his theorem.
72Statement by the influential German-Dutch mathematician and educator Hans Freudenthal from 1969,
quoted in both van Lambalgen (1987), p. 8 and Terwijn (2016), p. 51.
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Patternlessness
This is the most direct attack on the “paradox of probability”, which states that each
individual sequence has probability zero despite the huge differences in their (true or
apparent) “randomness”. We use the notation of §4, so that µ∞ is the probability measure
on the set 2N of all binary sequences induced by the 50-50 measure on the outcome space
{0, 1} of a single fair coin flip (the discussion is easily adapted to other cases).
As opposed to single outcomes, a key role will be played by tests, i.e. (measurable) sets
T ⊂ 2N of outcomes for which µ∞(T ) = 0. Such a test defines a property that a sequence
x ∈ 2N may or may not have, namely membership of T . Conversely, and perhaps less
circularly, one may start with a given pattern that x might have, which would make it
appear less random if it had it, and express this pattern as a test T . Conceptually, tests
contain outcomes that are supposed to be “atypical”, and randomness of x ∈ 2N will be
defined by the property of not belonging to any such test, making x “typical”. For example,
the property limN→∞N
−1
∑N
n=1 xn = 1/2 is “typical” for a fair coin flip and indeed (by
the strong law of large numbers) it holds with probability 1 (in that the set E of all x for
which this limit exists and equals 1/2 has µ∞(E) = 1, so that its complement T = 2N\E
has µ∞(T ) = 0). One has to proceed very carefully, though, since all singletons T = {x}
for x ∈ 2N are to be excluded; indeed, these all have measure zero and yet, returning
to the paradox of probability, some uncontroversially random sequence x (on whatever
definition) would fail to be random by the criterion just proposed if all measure zero sets
were included in the list of tests. Kolmogorov’s former postdoc Martin-Lo¨f (1966) saw his
way out of this dilemma, combining techniques from computability/recursion theory with
some ideas from the intuitionistic/constructive mathematics of the great L.E.J. Brouwer:
1. One specializes to tests of the form T = ∩n∈NUn, where Un+1 ⊆ Un and
µ∞(Un) ≤ 2−n, (B.3)
which guarantees that µ∞(T ) = 0. Perhaps the simplest example is not the law of
large numbers, for which see Li & Vita´nyi (2008), §2.4, Example 2.4.2, but the test
where Un consists of all sequences starting with n zeros; clearly, µ
∞(Un) = 2
−n. In
this case, the test T = {xlove} does consist of a singleton xlove = 000 · · · (zeros only).
2. Both the sets Un and the map n 7→ Un have to be computable in a suitable sense.73
3. A sequence x ∈ 2N is called Martin-Lo¨f random if x /∈ T for any such test T .
If x /∈ T , one says that x passes the test T . Note that the computability requirement
implies that the set of all tests T satisfying these two criteria is countable, which fact by
itself already shows what a huge cut in the set of all measure-zero sets has been achieved.74
It should be clear that this definition makes no sense if the sample space is finite, but
in order to adhere to Earman’s principle one could still check to what extent randomness
of sequences is determined by their finite initial segments. This is indeed the case, as
follows from the detailed structure of the admissible sets Un above (see footnote 73).
73First, each Un has to be open in 2
N, which means that Un = ∪σ∈VnN(σ), where Vn ⊂ 2
∗ and
N(σ) = {σy | y ∈ 2N} consists of all sequences x = σy that start with the given finite part σ. Second,
each Vn must be countable, so that Vn = ∪mσ(n,m), where each σ(n,m) ∈ 2
∗. Finally, there must be a
single program enumerating the sets (Vn), so that all in all one requires a (partial) computable function
σ : N × N → 2∗ such that Un = ∪mN(σ(n,m)) and hence T = ∩n ∪m N(σ(n,m)). Such a set T is called
effective, and if also (B.3) holds, then T is an effective measure zero set or Martin-Lo¨f test.
74There is even a single “universal” Martin-Lo¨f test U such that x /∈ U iff x is Martin-Lo¨f random.
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Unpredictability
Unpredictability is formalized as the impossibility of a successful betting strategy on the
successive digits of a random sequence x = (x1, x2, . . .). Suppose a punter with initial
capital d(0) starts by betting b(0) on x1 = 0 and b(1) on x1 = 1, where b(0) + b(1) = d(0),
with fair payoff d(x1) = 2b(0) if x1 = 0 and d(x1) = 2b(1) if x1 = 1. Note that
d(0) + d(1) = 2(b(0) + b(1)) = 2d(0). (B.4)
This motivates the concept of a martingale as a function d : 2∗ → [0,∞) that satisfies
d(σ0) + d(σ1) = 2d(σ), (B.5)
for each σ ∈ 2∗. Both the betting strategy itself and the payoff (for given x ∈ 2N) can be
reconstructed from d: the bet on the N + 1’th digit xN+1 is given by
b(xN+1 = 0) = 12d(xN0); (B.6)
b(xN+1 = 1) = 12d(xN1), (B.7)
and after N bets the punter owns d(x|N ). A martingale d succeeds on A ⊂ 2N if
lim sup
N→∞
d(x|N ) =∞ for each x ∈ A, (B.8)
in which case the punter beats the casino.75 Our first impulse would now be to call x ∈ 2N
random if there exists no martingale that succeeds on A = {x}, but, as shown by Ville
(1939), this property captures something seen before, crucially different from randomness:
Let A ⊂ 2N. Then µ∞(A) = 0 if and only if there exists a martingale that succeeds on A.
Of course, A should be measurable. In particular, for any sequence x ∈ 2N there exists a
martingale that succeeds on x, and hence no sequence x would be random on the criterion
that no martingale succeeds on it. Fortunately, the previous two definitions of randomness
suggest that all that is missing is a suitable notion of computability for martingales. This
notion was provided by Schnorr (1971): all that needs to be added is that the class of
martingales d that succeed on A be uniformly left computably enumerable, in the sense that
firstly each real number d(σ) is the limit of a computable increasing sequence of rational
numbers, and secondly that there is a single program that computes d(σ) in that way.
Defining x ∈ 2N to be Schnorr random if there exists no uniformly left computably enu-
merable martingale that succeeds on it,76 one has the crowning theorem on 1-randomness:
Theorem B.1 A sequence x ∈ 2N is Kolmogorov–Chaitin random iff it is Martin-Lo¨f ran-
dom and iff it is Schnorr random (and these equivalent conditions define 1-randomness).
Thus the criteria of incompressibility (Kolmogorov–Chaitin), patternlessness (Martin-
Lo¨f), and unpredictability (Schnorr) for randomness coincide, which is truly remarkable.77
75In practice someone beating the casino will go home with a finite amount of money. The fact that the
right-hand side of (B.8) is infinite is the result of idealizing long strings by sequences: if the punter has a
uniform winning strategy and places infinitely many bets, he will earn an infinite amount of money.
76In the literature the term ‘Schnorr randomness’ is often used differently, namely to indicate that the
martingales d in the above definition are merely computable, which yields a weaker notion of randomness.
Also, note that Schnorr (1971) used so-called supermartingales in his definition, for which one has ≤
instead of equality in (B.5), but martingales also work, cf. Downey & Hirschfeldt (2010), Theorem 6.3.4.
77The equivalence between the criteria of Martin-Lo¨f and of Kolmogorov–Chaitin was proved by Chaitin
(cf. Calude, 2010, Theorem 6.35) and by Schnorr (1973). The equivalence between Martin-Lo¨f and Schnorr
is due to Schnorr (1971), Staz 5.3. See also Downey & Hirschfeldt (2010), Theorems 6.2.3 and 6.3.4.
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Some reflections on 1-randomness
Any sound definition of randomness (for binary sequences) has to navigate between Scylla
and Charybdis: if the definition is too weak (such as Borel normality), counterexamples
will undermine it (such as Champernowne’s number), but if it is too strong, it will not
hold almost surely in a 50-50 Bernoulli process.78 In this respect 1-randomness does very
well: see Theorem 4.1 and the theorem below (which lies at the basis of Corollary 4.2):
Theorem B.2 Any 1-random sequence is Borel normal, incomputable, and contains any
finite string infinitely often.79
In fact, since I sometimes use computability as a mathematical metaphor for determinism,
it is worth mentioning that 1-random sequences are incomputable in a very strong sense:
each 1-random sequence x is immune in the sense that neither the set {n ∈ N | xn = 1}
nor its complement {n ∈ N | xn = 0} is computably enumerable (c.e.), or can even contain
an infinite c.e. subset. Thus 1-randomness is far stronger than mere incomputability (or
perhaps indeterminism), so that the numerous theorems in the literature that show, on
the basis of either Bell’s Theorem or the Kochen–Specker Theorem, that measurement
outcome sequences cannot be computable fall far short of the real goal of proving that
they are 1-random; see Kamminga (2019) and references therein for a survey.
Furthermore, 1-randomness is a tail property : adding any finite segment to x, or
deleting any finite part from it, or altering any finite number of digits in x, does not affect
its property of being 1-random (Calude, 2010, Theorem 6.40).80
Finally, it would be interesting to compare 1-random sequences with Brouwer’s choice
sequences from intuitionistic mathematics, especially (in the light of our anti-polar concept
of randomness of §2) the “lawless” ones.81 Von Mises (1919) mentioned choice sequences
as an inspiration for his idea of a Kollektiv (van Lambalgen, 1996), but as far as I know
little has been done with this idea in the modern setting. See also Gisin (2018).
78This example is not essential for the theory, see Downey & Hirschfeldt (2010), §6.12. Even in the
context of a 50-50 Bernoulli process, in the absence of theorems to that effect it is not easy to give examples
of notions of randomness that are so strong that they fail to hold almost surely, but n-randomness may
be a candidate. This notion is obtained by strengthening the requirements on the function σ mentioned
in footnote 73; see Downey & Hirschfeldt (2010), §6.8, and n-randomness for n > 1 implies 1-randomness.
But perhaps the following example works: some people might say that Chaitin’s Ω and its derivatives are
the only genuinely random numbers (see e.g. Calude, 2010, §7.1); of course these have measure zero.
79See the footnotes to Corollary 4.2 for the meaning of these terms, and Calude (2010), §6.4 for proofs.
80Consistent with Earman’s principle, it follows from the Kolmogorov-Chaitin definition that even this
tail property is ultimately determined by initial segments, just by larger ones than those removed.
81See Troelstra (1977) and references therein to the original literature. For a quick summary, quoted
from Troelstra (1996): ‘A choice sequence in Brouwer’s sense is a sequence of natural numbers (to keep it
simple), which is not a priori given by a law or recipe for the elements, but which is created step by step
(. . . ); the process will go on indefinitely, but it is never finished.’ He then goes on to discuss what he calls
‘a rather extreme variant of choice sequence, the so-called lawless sequences’: ‘Informally, we think of a
lawless sequence of natural numbers as a process of choosing values in N (. . . ) under the a priori restriction
that at any stage of the construction never more that an initial segment has been determined and that
no restrictions have been imposed on future choices, [and that] there is a commitment to determine more
and more values (so the sequence is infinite). (. . . ) A lawless sequence may be compared to the sequence
of casts of a die. There too, at any given stage in the generation of a sequence never more than an initial
segment is known.’ See Hansen (2018) for a recent analysis emphasising the idea of lawlessness, which,
in so far as the comparison with random sequences is appropriate, seems to lie on the side of process
randomness, cf. footnote 25. On the other hand, 1-random sequences concern poduct randomness, and are
not lawless at all (as shown for example by Theorem B.2 above). To further mark the difference, however
lawless its creation process, no finished sequence can be totally lawless. For example, Baudet’s Conjecture,
proved by van der Waerden (1921), implies that each binary sequence x satisfies certain arithmetic laws.
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